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SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS:
PERQUISITE OF SENIORITY OR DEFERRED
COMPENSATION FOR RETURNING
VETERANS?
Supplemental unemployment benefts (SUB beneftts), which are paid to employ-
ees during periods of layoff, have caused much controversy with respect to veterans
who claim such benefits after a period of military service. On June 10, 1980, the
Supreme Court decided Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., and held that SUB benefits
are a seniority right which allows a veteran to include time spent in the military in
computing the amount of benefits to which he or she is entitled, rather than short-
term compensation, in which case his or her period of service would not have been
counted This Note, which begins with a discussion of SUB benets and the concept
of seniority in collective bargaining agreements, reviews the tests traditonally em-
ployed by courts to determine when a benefit is a perquisite of seniority or simply a
wage substitute. The Note concludes with a discussion of the Court's opinion in
Coffy, and argues that because SUB benefits are more analogous to short-term com-
pensation, the Court should not have permitted a veteran to include military service
time in quantifying his or her right to SUB benefts.
INTRODUCTION
A RECURRENT DILEMMA FACED by the Supreme Court arisesfrom the integration of returning soldiers into the industrial
work force in the context of existing collective bargaining agree-
ments. A veteran's right to be reemployed by his former em-
ployer, without suffering losses because of his service in the
military, has been guaranteed by Congress since 1940.1 Employ-
ers are required to restore returning veterans to their former posi-
tions or to positions of "like seniority, status, and pay."2
1. Veterans' reemployment rights were created by the passage of the Selective Train-
ing and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 8, Pub. L. No. 76-703, 54 Stat. 885 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 301-318 (1940)). The provisions regarding the reemployment in the Selective
Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73
(1964)), as amended by Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat.
100. The most recent version, essentially unchanged from earlier statutes for the purposes
of this Note, appears in the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C.
§§ 2021-26 (1976). The Note will refer to the above provisions as the Veterans' Act.
2. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(B)(i). The Act provides that
(a) In the the case of any person who is inducted into the Armed Forces of the
United States under the Military Selective Service Act (or under any prior or
subsequent corresponding law) for training and who leaves a position (other than
a temporary position) in the employ of any employer in order to perform such
training and service, and (I) receives a certificate described in section 9(a) of the
Military Selective Service Act (relating to the satisfactory completion of military
service), and (2) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after
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There has been considerable litigation, however, concerning a
returning veteran's right to count time spent in the service in cal-
culating the usual incidents of the employment relationship, such
as the order of layoff and recall, vacation time, severance pay,
pension accrual, and unemployment benefits.3 These elements of
employment may be governed by collective bargaining agree-
ments, the terms of which vary from industry to industry. Unfor-
tunately, Congress has never defined the key terms--"seniority,"
"status," and "other benefits"-found in successive reenactments
of veterans' reemployment legislation,4 the most recent version be-
ing the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Act of 1974.1 Con-
sequently, courts have reached inconsistent results when applying
the terms of the Veterans' Act to specific benefits claimed by veter-
ans under their respective collective bargaining agreements.
6
On June 10, 1980, in Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp.,' the
Supreme Court settled a conffict in the circuits concerning supple-
mental unemployment benefits (SUB benefits).8 SUB benefits are
paid by the employer to workers who are laid off, in addition to
available state unemployment insurance payments. In deciding
Coffy, the Court cbnsidered whether SUB benefits are a type of
such person is relieved from such training and service or from hospitalization
continuing after discharge for a period of not more than one year-
(B) if such position was in the employ. . . of a private employer, such per-
son shall-
(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by
such employer or the employer's successor in interest to such position or to a
position of like seniority, status, and pay;
(b)(1) Any person who is restored to or employed in a position in accordance
with the provisions of the clause. . . (B) of subsection (a) of this section shall be
considered as having been on furlough or leave of absence during such person's
period of training and service in the Armed Forces, shall be so restored or reem-
ployed without loss of seniority, shall be entitled to participate in insurance or
other benefits offered by the employer pursuant to established rules and practices
relating to employees on furlough or leave of absence in effect with the employer
at the time such person was inducted into such forces, and shall not be discharged
from such position without cause within one year after such restoration or reem-
ployment.
3. See notes 29-84 infra and accompanying text.
4. See notes 1-2 supra.
5. 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-26 (1976).
6. See notes 118-157 infra and accompanying text.
7. 461 F. Supp. 344, a7dmem., 590 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4683
(1980).
8. The decision by the Northern District of Ohio in Coff', by holding SUB benefits
to be short term compensation, conflicted with decisions in the Third and Seventh Circuits
and in the Southern District of Ohio, all of which found SUB benefits to be a perquisite of
seniority. The conflict is discussed at notes 118-157 infra and accompanying text.
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seniority right protected by the Veterans' Act, or merely a form of
short term compensation outside of its purview. A finding that
SUB benefits are a perquisite of seniority9 allows veterans to in-
clude time spent in military service in figuring the amount of SUB
benelits to which they are entitled. If SUB benefits were not a
perquisite of seniority, military service time could not, however,
be counted toward SUB credits. The judicial determination nec-
essarily focused on the formulae set out in each industry's collec-
tive bargaining agreements, but it was also made in light of
Congressional intent to recognize the contributions and sacrifices
by veterans to the nation.'0
This Note first discusses SUB benefits" and the seniority con-
cept in collective bargaining agreements.' 2 Next, the Note out-
lines various tests developed over the past thirty years to
determine when a specific benefit is a guaranteed seniority perqui-
site,' 3 culminating in the test developed by the Court in Alabama
Power Co. v. Davis. 4 The Note compares the conflicting circuit
decisions on pension benefits 5 which led to Alabama Power with
the analogous conflict in decisions on SUB benefits in light of Ala-
bama Power's proposed test.'6 The Note concludes that because
SUB benefits function more as a form of short term compensation
for work actually performed than as an aspect of seniority, such
benefits should not have been protected by the Veterans' Act.
I. SUB BENEFITS: THEIR HISTORY AND MECHANICS
SUB benefit plans were originally included in collective bar-
gaining agreements as a result of compromises achieved on the
issue of guaranteed annual wages.' 7 State unemployment insur-
9. Since seniority is not defined in veterans' reemployment legislation, but is ac-
cepted as a catchall concept in industrial practice for a variety of benefits allotted according
to longevity of service, courts have resorted to the phrase "perquisite of seniority" as a
reference point in the veterans' reemployment rights cases. Eg., Foster v. Dravo Corp.,
420 U.S. 92, 95 (1975).
10. See Silver, Operation of the "Escalator Clause" in Fringe Benfits Cases, 60 MINN.
L. REv. 45, 47-48, 55 (1975). The author discusses judicial interpretations of the terms of
the 1974 Act, application of those terms to collective bargaining agreements, and the need
to look beyond the conventional meaning of seniority found in those agreements given
Congress' broad, remedial intentions concerning veterans.
11. See notes 11-29 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 30-40 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 41-84 infra and accompanying text.
14. 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
15. See notes 85-117 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 118-157 infra and accompanying text.
17. Although few guaranteed employment plans have ever been in effect in the United
496 [Vol. 30.494
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ance benefits were inadequate income security to workers in cycli-
cal industries such as auto and steel in which employees face
layoffs during recurring periods of business downturn. Thus, in
1955, the United Auto Workers negotiated the first SUB plan,
which provided additional aid to the unemployed work force but
stopped short of guaranteeing its wages. 18
Most SUB plans are activated by the payment of state unem-
ployment compensation benefits. When a covered worker is eligi-
ble for state unemployment compensation, he or she becomes
eligible for SUB benefits.' 9 The plans, funded by employer con-
tributions up to an agreed maximum amount, give the company
the benefit of a fixed cost. In the prototypical plan, payment to the
workers depends on the availability of money in the trust fund to
pay the benefits.20
There are two types of plans: funded plans and individual
trust account plans.2' This Note is concerned only with funded
plans in which the employee generally receives the difference be-
tween his state unemployment compensation plus other earnings
and a fixed percentage of his or her weekly after tax earnings. To
be eligible, the employee must have been employed for one year
and must qualify for state unemployment compensation.22
The amount of benefits a laidoff worker may receive depends
both on the number of credits accumulated by the worker and the
level of the trust fund. Each worker earns a certain number of
credits for each week worked up to a maximum number beyond
States, the best known were established at Proctor & Gamble in 1923 and at Hormel and
Nunn-Bush in the 1930's. Beginning in 1944, the steel workers' and auto workers' unions
began to campaign actively for guaranteed annual wages from their employers. See [1955]
THE GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE 2-4 (BNA).
18. See G. REDJA, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY 365 (1976);
Eberling, The Guaranteed 4nnual Wage and (Inemployment Compensation, 8 VAND. L.
REV. 458 (1955).
19. Linking eligibility for SUB benefits and eligibility for unemployment compensa-
tion has minimized administrative problems. See E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P.
KIENAST, THE PRACTICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 352 (5th ed. 1976).
20. S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING ON MANAGEMENT 453 (1960).
21. The individual trust account, first negotiated in the glass industry in 1955, is less
widely used than the funded plan. Trust accounts are established in the name of the indi-
vidual employee and can accumulate to a specified maximum amount. Thereafter, the
company contribution is used to increase vacation pay. The employee may draw on such
plans when he or she has been laid off for one full pay period or when absent from work
for two full pay periods because of injury or sickness. There is no tie-in with state unem-
ployment compensation. Funds in a worker's account are paid to the worker upon termi-
nation, retirement, or to the estate at death. Id. at 454-55.
22. Id.
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which no accumulation is possible. The credit units have no es-
tablished monetary value but are used merely to determine the
length of time a worker may draw benefits.23 When an employee
draws a SUB benefit payment a specified number of credits are
cancelled. For example, one credit might be cancelled for each
week during which SUB benefits are received. If funding for the
trust plan is low, credit units will be cancelled at a higher rate.24
The following scenario should help to illustrate the way in
which a SUB plan works. A collective bargaining agreement may
provide for workers to accrue one-half credit for each week during
which a worker put in at least thirty-two hours of service. Credits
may also be accrued while an employee is taking earned vacations
or sick leave. Then, in the event of a four week layoff, an em-
ployee who has had eight weeks of association with the employer
will have four credits to use for obtaining SUB payments, and will
thus be fully covered for the layoff period.25 Since it is traditional
for employers to lay off workers with the shortest length of service
first-usually the workers with concomitantly lower pay and
fewer skills-SUB benefits are more likely to be paid to these
short term personnel.26 Long term workers are usually insulated
from having to take advantage of SUB plans, unless layoffs are
extensive.
Employers are aided because the plans help them preserve
their labor force during layoffs. The income supplement gives the
employee less incentive to look elsewhere for employment while
laid off. The cost to employers has not proven overly burdensome
because workers essentially fund the accounts by foregoing part of
their wage increases.
In the context of these plans, a difficult legal issue arose con-
cerning the reemployment rights of returning veterans. A veteran
whose collective bargaining agreement includes a funded SUB
plan no doubt wants the period spent in military service to be in-
cluded in his or her total of accumulated SUB credits. This
presumes that SUB credits should have continued to accrue dur-
ing the entire period of military service just as if private employ-
23. Harvey, Supplemental Unemployment Benefits Plans, 96 TR. AND EST. 263 (1957).
24. Id.
25. E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, supra note 19, at 351-52; S. SLICHTER, J.
HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, supra note 20, at 453-54.
26. G. REJDA, supra note 12.
27. Id. at 365-66; J. TURNBULL, C. WILLIAMS & E. CHEIT, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
SECURITY 297 (3d ed. 1967).
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ment had continued uninterrupted.28 Employers have opposed
the accumulation of credits during such periods of absence, con-
tending that the accrual of SUB credits is a substitute for wages
and thus is not part of the seniority rights guaranteed to returning
veterans. The issue was resolved by the Coffy case,2 9 in which the
Supreme Court decided that SUB benefits are a perquisite of sen-
iority, upholding the veteran's position.
II. SENIORITY: GETTING BACK ON THE ESCALATOR
The "escalator" analogy offered by the Supreme Court to ex-
plain veterans' reemployment rights is instructive: a veteran reen-
ters the work force "at the precise point he would have occupied
had he kept his position continuously during [his service in the
military]." 30 In addition to stepping back into a particular job as
if he had never gotten off the escalator-that is, with no loss of
seniority-a returning veteran has a strong interest in carrying
along certain benefits which he would have acquired but for his
absence in the military. Such benefits includes promotions, vaca-
tions, and numerous other fringe benefits, which may be tied to
employees' seniority status, depending on the particular industry's
collective bargaining agreement. Thus, both the definition and
scope of the term "seniority" are of critical concern to employees,
as well as to employers who bear the cost of benefits.
A. An Introduction to the Princoile of Seniority
In the absence of legislative guidance, courts have turned to
the collective bargaining agreement at issue for the proper inter-
pretation of seniority.3 The Supreme Court has concluded that
28. Although this argument appears to be based upon the literal language of the stat-
ute, see note 46 infra, the logical extension of such a view would have wages accrue during
military service. There is no indication, however, that Congress intended veterans to re-
ceive double pay.
29. Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp., 48 U.S.L.W. 4683 (1980). For a discussion of Coffy,
see notes 158-175 infra and accompanying text.
30. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Co., 328 U.S. 275, 284-85 (1946). The
Court also noted that the legislation was to be "liberally construed for the benefit of those
who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need." Id. at 285.
31. The concept of seniority is a function of collective bargaining agreements. F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 375-76 (1960). The Supreme Court
has noted that a worker's seniority arises only out of contract or statute, and that a worker
does not have an inherent right to seniority in service. Trailmobile v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40,
53 n.21 (1947). Furthermore, the Court has pointed out that the principle of seniority is
used almost exclusively in unionized industry. Id. Therefore, when interpreting a vet-
eran's seniority rights, the Court has observed that such rights must be interpreted in light
19801
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Congress did not create a system of seniority when it passed the
Veterans' Act, "but recogniz[ed] its operation as part of the proc-
ess of collective bargaining. We must therefore look to the con-
ventional uses of the seniority system in the process of collective
bargaining in order to determine the rights of seniority which the
Selective Service Act guaranteed the veteran. 32
The word seniority generally connotes length of service.33
Longevity, in turn, is used as the measure of an employee's right
to certain benefits.34 There are two broad types of seniority: com-
petitive status seniority and benefit seniority. Competitive status
seniority links length of service to an employee's status relative to
other employees. It affects such things as promotions, transfers,
and job protection during layoffs. Benefit seniority, as the term
suggests, determines the attainment of benefits, rights, and privi-
leges based on the individual worker's length of service, without
reference to other employees' job longevity. This type of seniority
affects such matters as severance pay, pension payments, length of
vacation, and SUB benefits.
Either type of seniority stabilizes the industrial work force by
increasing job security, which decreases workers' incentive to
move in search of other employment. And, while the operation of
the seniority system may appear to restrict management's freedom
of the applicable union contract. Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337
U.S. 521, 526 (1949).
32. There are great variations in the use of the seniority principle through collec-
tive bargaining bearing on the time when seniority begins, determination of the
units subject to the same seniority, and the consequences which flow from senior-
ity. All these variations disclose limitations upon the dogmatic use of the princi-
ple of seniority in the interest of the ultimate aims of collective bargaining.
Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521, 526 (1976).
33. [1978] 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA)
75:11.
34. Seniority is used most frequently to determine brder of employee layoffs, promo-
tions, and transfers. In the vast majority of collective bargaining agreements, the em-
ployee's continuous service is the sole determinant of his or her seniority status. Id. at 75:1.
Various types of seniority exist within a seniority unit. These include companywide,
plantwide, departmental, occupational, and combination forms. Id. at 75:41. Relative sen-
iority rights are based on three factors: (1) the date on which seniority begins to accumu-
late, (2) changes in seniority because of changes in work assignments, and (3) seniority
changes caused by work interruptions, such as layoffs or sick leave. Id. at 75:121, 75:81.
One commentator has argued that the seniority system developed because of worker
concern for job security rather than from either the need to protect workers from employer
favoritism or from the need for an objective dispute resolution mechanism. She concludes
that ". . . the heart of any seniority system is protection against discharge or layoff, partic-
ularly for long service employees." Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The
LayoffProblem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177, 196-97 (1976).
35. S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASI, supra note 20, at 106.
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in personnel decisions,36 it also provides an impersonal, objective
means for making such decisions.37
There are certain limitations inherent in any system of senior-
ity. Seniority is not an absolute employee privilege,38 and gener-
ally is used only in unionized industry.39 Probationary periods are
usually required before workers become entitled to seniority.
Workers may be subject to the loss of seniority rights if they quit,
are discharged for just cause, are laid off for a very long time, take
an unauthorized leave of absence, or retire.4' Further, some may
be excluded from the protection of the seniority principle alto-
gether. This limitation is of special concern to veterans seeking
full reemployment rights.
B. Judicial Interpretations of Seniority Benefits
The Supreme Court has developed tests to determine when a
specific benefit is a guaranteed perquisite of seniority. Early cases
construing the Veterans' Act dealt principally with issues of com-
petitive status seniority such as promotion, layoff order, and reten-
tion of seniority after a corporate merger.41 The results were less
than consistent.
In Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp.,42 the Court
faced a difficult problem: reconciling an employer's layoff prac-
tices pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the guar-
antee against discharge accorded returned veterans under the
Veterans' Act.43 The veteran claimed that the Veterans' Act insu-
lated him entirely from layoffs which, he argued, were a form of
discharge. The Court, in rejecting his claim, established the esca-
lator principle.4 The Court indicated that the purpose of the Vet-
erans' Act was to prevent a veteran from being penalized because
of necessary absence from civilian employment.45 It was not,
36. IM. at 139.
37. E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, supra note 19, at 381-82.
38. See Trailmobile v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 53 n.21 (1947).
39. Id.
40. E. BEA, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KiENAST, supra note 19, at 376-77.
41. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
42. 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
43. Id. ai 280. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 8(c), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 301 (1940), provided that a veteran restored to his former position "shall not be dis-
charged from such position without cause within one year of such restoration." Id. In
Fishgold, the employer had taken Fishgold's military service time into account before lay-
ing him off. The employee argued a layoff was a form of discharge. 328 U.S. at 285.
44. Id. at 284-85. See notes 30-31 supra and accompanying text.
45. 328 U.S. at 284.
1980]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
however, designed to grant a veteran priority over nonveterans
with higher seniority.46 Thus, the veteran returns to his or her job
at precisely that point at which he or she would have been had not
military service intervened.47
The escalator principle was incorporated into the Veterans'
Act in 1948.48 It requires courts to decide whether the benefit
claimed by the veteran is a perquisite of seniority since, according
to Fishgold, "[w]hat [Congress] undertook to do was to give the
veteran protection within the framework of the seniority sys-
tem. . . . Seniority was construed for this purpose in the con-
text of the continuance of the employment relationship. 0 In
collective bargaining agreements, however, seniority is also de-
fined in relation to actual work performed." The Supreme Court,
in applying the escalator principle, found the veteran's rights com-
plicated by this distinction. 2 In McKinney v. Missouri-K-T Rail-
road,53 the Court considered whether a nonautomatic promotion
was an incident of seniority protected by the 1940 Act. In McKin-
ney, promotion was contingent not only on longevity, but on a
worker's fitness and ability,54 an evaluation made by the em-
ployer. The Court concluded that
on application for re-employment a veteran is not entitled to
demand that he be assigned a position higher than that he for-
merly held when promotion to such a position depends, not
simply on seniority or some other form of automatic progres-
sion, but on the exercise of discretion on the part of the em-
46. Id. at 285-86.
47. Id. at 284-85.
48. This provision is currently § 2021(b):
(2) It is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress that any person who is
restored to or employed in a position in accordance with the provisions of clause
(A) or (B) of subsection (a) of this section should be so restored or reemployed in
such manner as to give such person such status in the person's employment as the
person would have enjoyed f such person had continued in such employment con-
tinuously from the time of such person's entering the Armed Forces until the time
of such person's restoration to such employment, or reemployment.
(current version at 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
49. 328 U.S. at 288.
50. Id. at 287-88.
51. [1978] 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATION AND CONTRACTs (BNA) 75:1,
75:11. It should be noted that the Court in Fishgold did not consider the break in actual
work performance occasioned by a layoff to be a break in the continuity of an employee's
position. 328 U.S. at 286-88.
52. See Haggard, Veterans' Reemployment Rights and the "Escalator Princple" 51
B.U.L. REV. 539, 547-48 (1971).
53. 357 U.S. 265 (1958).
54. Id. at 266-67.
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ployer.55
Therefore the rights protected under the Veterans' Act are only
those benefits which would accrue by the mere fact that the em-
ployee continues in his or her job. If more than simple length of
service is required, the benefit is not one of those to which the
Veterans' Act applies.
In Tilton v. Missouri Pacjic Railroad,56 the veteran had, prior
to his military service, begun a probationary period for a discre-
tionary promotion. When he returned, he finished the training pe-
riod and applied for seniority status which would reflect his time
in the military. The Court, concentrating more on the "escalator
of terms and conditions" than on the employer's requirement for a
specified number of days of work for the company,57 decided that
the veteran's seniority date should have been fixed as of the date
he would have finished the probationary period had he not en-
tered military service. 58 The Court distinguished this promotion
from the one in McKinney because it did not depend on manage-
ment discretion. The Court also emphasized that McKinney's
"automatic progression" did not mean that a benefit such as pro-
motion had to be absolutely foreseeable by the employee.5 9 The
opinion established a "reasonable certainty" test to determine the
right to seniority rather than requiring a veteran to show it was
"absolutely certain as a matter of foresight" that a certain ad-
vancement in status would later occur.6 0
The Court, however, did not in fact conclude that a continuing
relationship with the employer before, during, and after military
service, would be enough to allow full seniority rights. Rather, the
Court stated that existing work requirements would have to be
met before the protection of the Veterans' Act was triggered. In
spite of the Court's protestations to the contrary, McKinney ap-
pears to disagree with this view.6
Only two years after Tilton, the Court, in Accardi v. Penn-
sylvania Railroad,62 added another gloss to the emerging standard
55. Id. at 272.
56. 376 U.S. 169 (1964).
57. Id. at 177.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 179.
60. Id. at 179-80.
61. In McKinney, the existence of a prerequisite other than length of service was cited
by the Court as reason not to invoke the Vetera' Act. See notes 53-56 supra and accom-
panying text.
62. 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
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for determining veteran's seniority rights: if the work requirement
did not operate in a consistent, predicatable manner for all em-
ployees, then the Court would pierce the requirement to find the
"real nature" of the benfits.63
In Accardi, the amount of severance pay paid to a particular
employee was contingent on how much "compensated service"
the employee had put in with the railroad, according to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. The Court opined that since a worker
could, theoretically, work seven days in one year and receive the
same credit toward severance pay as one who had worked every
day of the year, the work requirement was a sham.64 The Court
found that the "use of the label 'compensated service' cannot ob-
scure the fact that the real nature of these payments was compen-
sation for loss of jobs" measured by the rights and benefits
forfeited, not by actual past work.65 Thus, since length of service,
or seniority, was the only measure of the employee's right to the
benefit, military service time had to be counted in the severance
pay formula in keeping with Congress's intent.6 6
The Accardi decision amplified Fishgold as follows: if the pre-
requisite for a benefit is limited to the length of employment, then
the Fishgold escalator principle is applied. If the benefit depends
on more than the length of employment, then the escalator princi-
ple does not necessarily entitle the veteran to the benefit.67 Fur-
ther, if the contract requirement is nothing more than a
surreptitious means of circumventing veterans' rights, it can be ig-
nored. Conversely, if the contract requirement is genuine com-
pensation for work performed, then the benefit is not a perquisite
of seniority.
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. The Accardi Court noted that Congress intended that veterans "resume their old
employment without any loss because of their service to their country." Id. at 228.
67. In Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., 389 U.S. 323 (1967), the collective bargaining
agreement imposed two conditions upon eligibility for holiday and vacation pay in a given
year. The worker had met all work requirements for these benefits, but he had not met
either of the conditions--that he be in the company's employment on the one year anniver-
sary date of his starting work for the company and that he be on the payroll for the three
months preceding each paid holiday. In a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed a lower
court holding for the company and cited Accardi.
A commentator has suggested that the Court probably looked at the nature of the bene-
fit in Eagar and concluded it was actually compensation for work performed. Since the
worker had in fact fulfilled the work requirement, the Court probably felt that further
conditions, which really dealt with longevity, should not be allowed to defeat his claim to
the benefit. See Haggard, supra note 35, at 576.
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In spite of the guidance offered by the Accardi decision, lower
courts treated fringe benefit issues in veterans' reemployment
cases inconsistently. Several decisions came down on opposite
sides of the question of whether vacation rights were a protected
perquisite of seniority or an "other benefit" which was subject,
according to the Veterans' Act, to the employer's established rules
and practices, 68 such as an actual service requirement. One court
decided this distinction was not instructive. Rather, the key to
veterans' reemployment rights was whether the returned veterans
had substantially fulfilled the employer's requirement that em-
ployees earn their vacations.69  That court approved the em-
ployer's treatment of the amount of vacation as a perquisite of
seniority, but the right to the vacation as an earned benefit.70
The Seventh Circuit, in Ewert v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co. , 7
specifically rejected such reasoning. The Ewert court refused to
treat vacation length separately from the right to vacation. The
court decided that according to the Eagar72 application of Ac-
card, the vacation rights under this contract were perquisites of
68. Compare Locaynia v. American Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972) with
Kasmeier v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 437 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1971). The
Locaynia court interpreted Accardi as establishing a test of "automatic accrual" of benefits.
457 F.2d at 1255. Accardi had required an analysis of the real nature of the benefit rather
than a labelling approach. In light of Eagar, the Locaynia court decided that if a vacation
benefit was not an "other benefit," then it necessarily must be a "perquisite of seniority."
In so doing, the court ignored the work requirement in the collective bargaining agreement.
The Locaynia decision is too terse to be enlightening about the proper application of the
Accardi-Eagar principle. See Case Comment, Reemployment Rights: The Veteran and the
Vacation Benet, 53 B.U.L. REv. 480 (1973) for an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's failure to
confront the difference in nature between severance pay and vacation pay.
The collective bargaining agreement at issue in Kasmeier required an employee to
render 110 days of compensated service in the previous calendar year in order to qualify
for vacation rights. The court, distinguishing Accardi, decided this work requirement was
genuine, since it was uniformly applied. 437 F.2d at 154. Thus, these vacation rights were
"other benefits" rather than "perquisites of seniority" in direct
conflict with the Locaynia and Eagar decisions. The court insisted that more
could be required of workers seeking other benefits than the mere passage of time.
Here, the collective bargaining agreement established a legitimate work require-
ment which the veteran did not meet. Id. at 155.
69. One district court, in Connett v. Automatic Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Ill.
1971), suggested that the Kasmeier test is basically whether the employee "has substantially
earned his vacation." Id. at 1378 (emphasis added). The court preferred to concentrate on
this issue rather than on the arcane debate over whether a benefit is a seniority right or an
other benefit. Id. at 1375-78. The court accordingly found that the returned veterans were
not entitled to vacation pay for the time spent in the military.
70. Id. This distinction is an important one which not all courts have recognized.
The Locaynia court, for example, overlooked the distinction. See note 68 supra.
71. 477 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1973).
72. See note 67 supra.
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seniority.73
The Supreme Court finally resolved the conflict in Foster v.
Dravo Corp.,7 4 finding that where a benefit is conditioned on
"more than simple continued status as an employee," the protec-
tions of the Veterans' Act do not apply.75 In this case, a veteran
had not worked for twenty-five weeks, the minimum amount of
time for vacation eligibility. The Court affirmed a lower court
opinion holding that the vacation benefit was an earned benefit.76
The Court noted that "[g]enerally, the presence of a work require-
ment is strong evidence that the benefit in question was intended
as a form of compensation. '77 That is, when a benefit does not
accrue automatically, a returning veteran may not expect to have
his time in the military counted toward the amount of the benefit.
The decision distinguished this case from Accardi on the ground
that the work requirement in the case at bar was bona fide. The
Court found that these vacation benefits were intended as deferred
short term compensation for work already performed.78 Indeed,
the Court seems to have fallen back on what it termed the "com-
mon conception of a vacation as a reward for ... labor,"79 as a
substitute for an analysis of the real nature of the benefits."
The Court has gradually refined the test for determining when
a veteran may count his time in the military in calculating fringe
benefits. Using the Fishgold escalator principle as a starting point,
the Court has variously tried a "reasonable certainty" standard,"'
or examined the legitimacy of a work requirement.82 The Court
has also found on the "real nature" of the benefit in question,83
73. 477 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1973). In Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d
586 (2d Cir. 1973), the court held that the severance pay plan at issue was a "perquisite of
seniority," not compensation or "other benefits." The court noted that in Accardi and the
case at bar, it was the length of continuous service, rather than the nature of the service,
which determined the benefits. Id. at 589.
74. 420 U.S. 92 (1975).
75. Id. at 97.
76. Id. at 95-96.
77. Id. at 99.
78. Id. at 100.
79. Id. at 101.
80. For a critique of Foster, see The Right ofReturning Veterans to Vacation Benefits,
1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 704, 709, 709 n.148.
81. Tilton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 376 U.S. 169 (1964). See notes 56-61 supra and
accompanying text. Cf. McKinney v. Missouri-K.-T. R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1968) discussed
at notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
82. Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 92 (1975); Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R., 383 U.S.
225 (1966). See notes 62-67, 74-80 supra and accompanying text.
83. 383 U.S. at 230.
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and finally, on the existence of conditions precedent to the grant-
ing of the benefit.84 Such a conflicting line of cases, however, pro-
vided lower courts with no clear standard. Then, in 1977, the
Supreme Court reexamined the issue of a veteran's reemployment
rights.
III. ALABAMA POWER: A DEFINITIVE STANDARD FOR
SENIORITY RIGHTS OF VETERANS--OR ANOTHER
STOPGAP?
In a series of mid-1970's cases, various federal courts applied
the Accardi-Foster85 tests to nearly identical pension plans with
conflicting results. Three courts decided that pensions were not an
incident of seniority under the Veterans' Act,86 while two other
courts found that pension plans rewarded longevity rather than
actual work performed, and were thus perquisites of seniority pro-
tected by the Veterans' Act.87
In Litwicki v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Industries, Inc.,88 the
Third Circuit was confronted with a veteran who had failed to
meet a ten year "continuous service" vesting requirement for pen-
sion benefits because the employer would not credit the employee
for his time in the military. The court found that contrary to the
situation in Accardi, the continuous service prerequisite here was
a true work requirement. Under the collective bargaining agree-
ments, pension benefits were therefore deferred compensation and
not an incident of seniority for purposes of the Veterans' Act.89
The Tenth Circuit, in Jackson v. Beech Aircraft,9" followed
Litwicki in finding that the "substantial work requirement" pre-
vented the pension benefits from being considered a perquisite of
seniority.9' Thus the employers were not required to grant the
84. 420 U.S. at 98-99.
85. See notes 62-84 supra and accompanying text.
86. Jackson v. Beech Aircraft, 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975); Litwicki v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Indus., Inc., 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974); LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft, 90
L.R.R.M. 2929 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
87. Smith v. Industrial Employers & Distrib. Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Cal.
1974), aj'd, 546 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1976); Davis v. Alabama Power Co., 383 F. Supp. 880
(N.D. Ala. 1974), aft'd, 542 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1037 (1976).
88. 505 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1974).
89. Id. at 193. Ironically, the court allowed the veteran to count his 33 months of
military service toward his vesting time because the bargaining agreement expressly pro-
vided for this. Nonetheless, the court held that the existence of the work requirement
meant, under Accardi, that pensions could not ordinarily be considered as a seniority right.
90. 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975).
91. Id. at 1326.
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veteran credit-for his time in the military-either toward the
vesting or the amount of benefits to be given him.
Relying on the "work requirement" language of Accardi and
Foster, another district court in LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft,92
found that a minimum "credited service" prerequisite for pension
accrual was not a sham.93 The court reasoned further that giving
pension credit for short absences such as illness or union activites
did not defeat the essential work-related character of pension
rights.94 Impliedly, then, a long absence, not related to one's job,
such as military service, should not count toward a veteran's pen-
sion.
The LaPinta court also expressly rejected the employee's argu-
ment that Accardi required an analysis of the "real nature" of the
benefit before examination of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.95 Judge Thomas explained that Foster's clarification of Ac-
cardi required courts to focus first on the pension plan's terms in
order to shed light on the real nature of the benefit.96 The conclu-
sion here, as in Litwicki and Jackson, was that pension benefits
could not be classed as a seniority perquisite since they were con-
tingent on a substantial work requirement.97
Two other courts had earlier decided that the pension plans at
issue rewarded longevity rather than actual work on the job. To
arrive at its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit, in Smith v. Industrial
Employers and Distributors Association,98 eschewed "labels and
definitions" and examined the "true nature of pension benefits." 99
Pensions, said the court, are future rights,100 governed by length of
service.
The court in Davis v. Alabama Power Co. 101 found that an
accredited service requirement for vesting of pension rights was
longevity-related, emphasizing that the Act must be construed lib-
92. 90 L.R.R.M. 2929 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
93. Id. at 2932.
94. Id. at 2932 n.5.
95. Id. at 2931-32. The court acknowledged that the Second Circuit in Palmarozzo v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 490 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974), had
used a similar two step analysis to find that severance pay was indeed a perquisite of sen-
iority. 90 L.R.R.M. at 2931 n.4. See note 73 supra.
96. Id. at 2932. The court later had to reverse itself in light of Alabama Power. See
notes 139 and 143 infra and accompanying text.
'97. Id. at 2933.
98. 546 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1976).
99. Id. at 317-18.
100. Id. at 318.
101. 383 F. Supp. 880 (1974), aff'dper curiam, 542 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976).
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erally under the rule of Fishgold10 2 Consequently, no employer
could interfere with the protection of a returning veteran's em-
ployment status.'0 3 The court emphasized "the 'real nature' of the
pension benefits in the case at bar, and it concludes that the pur-
pose of this retirement benefit is to promote personnel stability by
giving employees an incentive to remain with the company."' 4
Thus, the returned veteran had to be treated as if he had worked
continuously for the employer during his years in the military.
Affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court, in Al-
abama Power Co. v. Davis,"°5 noted that when the particular bene-
fit at issue does not lend itself to easy classification as a seniority
right, it is necessary to consider the "nature of the benefit itself,"
as well as the "relative certainty" of the benefit's accrual. 0 6 The
Court distilled the line of veterans' reemployment rights cases,
identifying
two axes of analysis for determining whether a benefit is a right
of seniority secured to a veteran by § 9. If the benefit would
have accrued, with reasonable certainty, had the veteran been
continuously employed by the private employer, and if it is in
the nature of a reward for length of service, it is a "perquisite of
seniority." If, on the other hand, the veteran's right to the ben-
efit at the time he entered the military was subject to a signifi-
cant contingency, or if the benefit is in the nature of short-term
compensation for services rendered, it is not an aspect of sen-
iority within the coverage of § 9.107
The first part of the test, an amalgamation of the "reasonable
certainty" tests of McKinney and Tilton,08 led the Court to con-
clude that had the veteran "not entered the military, he would
almost certainly have accumulated accredited service for the pe-
riod between March 18, 1943, and October 8, 1945. ' 109 The sec-
ond part of the standard, combining Accardi and Foster, allowed
the Court to down-play the work requirement, noting that "Foster
.. .turned on the nature of vacation benefits, not on the particu-
lar formula by which those benefits were calculated." 0
102. 383 F. Supp. at 887.
103. Id. at 888.
104. Id.
105. 431 U.S. 581 (1977).
106. Id. at 587.
107. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
108. See notes 53-61 supra and accompanying text.
109. 431 U.S. at 591.
110. Id. at 592.
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The true nature of the pension plan was a reward for longev-
ity. The Court said:
The most significant factor pointing to this conclusion is the
lengthy period required for pension rights to vest in the em-
ployee. It is difficult to maintain that a pension increment is
deferred compensation for a year of actual service when it is
only the passage of years in the same company's employ, and
not the service rendered, that entitles the employee to that in-
crement.' 11
Further, the Court reasoned that the function of pensions on
the employment system-an incentive to the development of a sta-
ble work force-supports the view that pensions reward length of
service. A pension plan allows the employee to trade financial se-
curity in his or her old age for long term loyalty to one em-
ployer." 2  Such rewards for continuous employment with the
same employer serve the purposes of the Veterans' Act and thus
should be treated as a perquisite of seniority.
In the pension cases following Alabama Power, the courts ap-
plied this test without difficulty." 3 Although the "compensated
service" requirement varied from case to case, courts felt that dif-
ferences in pension plans did not warrant a result different from
that in Alabama Power. "4 Since pension rights per se were within
the scope of benefits protected by the Veterans' Act,' ' 5 apparent
work requirements in any given pension plan were easily pierced
by an inquiry into the essential nature of such benefits."
6
111. dat 593.
The Court noted that pension payments do resemble compensation for work per-
formed, but that any benefit rendered in an employment context could conceivably be
viewed in such a manner. Id. at 592-93. Therefore, this observation was not helpful in
deciding whether a particular benefit "recompenses labor or rewards longevity .... I.
112. Id. at 594.
113. The LaPinta case, for example, was remanded by the Sixth Circuit in light of
Alabama Power. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the re-
turned veteran, ordering that his period in the service be credited towards his pension bene-
fits. LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft, 96 L.R.R.M. 2321 (N.D. Ohio 1977). See notes 92-97
supra and accompanying text.
114. E.g., Beckley v. Lipe-Rollway Corp., 448 F. Supp. 563 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The
differences in the pension plans in this case and in Alabama Power do not warrant a differ-
ent result here. The Supreme Court in Alabama Power indicated that the nature of the
benefits in question was determinative." Id. at 566); Turnington v. Standard Register Co.,
97 L.R.R.M. 2877 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (the court stated that although the compensated service
requirement varied from the one in Alabama Power, the variation did not dictate a differ-
ent outcome. Id. at 2878).
115. Accord, Horton v. Armour and Co., 98 L.R.R.M. 2651, 2652 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
116. See, e.g., Beckley v. Lipe-Rollway Corp., 448 F. Supp. 563 (N.D.N.Y. 1978), in
which the court said "the existence of the work requirement in the present case [does not
change] the essential nature of the pension benefits." Id. at 566-67.
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In spite of the general tenor of Alabama Power's language, the
Court's two part test" 7 has not proved as workable outside the
area of pension benefits. Recently, a flurry of conflicting decisions
concerning veterans' supplemental unemployment benefits forced
the Supreme Court to reconsider veterans' reemployment rights.
IV. SUB BENEFITS: A CASE STUDY IN THE SHORTCOMINGS
OF ALABAMA POWER
SUB benefits, like severance pay, vacations, and pension bene-
fits, have not traditionally been linked to seniority. Although Ala-
bama Power seems to establish a test capable of application to
more than pensions, SUB benefits have, both before and after Ala-
bama Power, created analytical difficulties for the courts.
A. Pre-Alabama Power Cases
In two cases decided prior to Alabama Power the courts found
that SUB benefits were entitled to protection under the Veterans'
Act. The court held in Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 8 that
SUB benefits, which accrued with the passage of time, were sen-
iority rights. The court examined the provisions of the SUB
plan" 19 and concluded that its work requirement was not genuine.
Instead, it led to the "bizarre results" condemned in Accardi:'2°
an employee who worked only one hour in a week would receive
the same one-half SUB credit as would an employee who worked
forty hours in that week. 2 '
Similarly, the court in Akers v. General Motors Corp. 2 treated
SUB benefits as a seniority right, finding passage of time to be the
operative factor for the acquisition of SUB credits. The SUB plan
at issue in Akers provided that an employee who had been laid off
would be entitled to accrue leveling week benefit credits.' 23 Be-
cause of this provision, "credit units accrue as time passes,
117. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
118. 477 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973).
119. The plan at issue here was a funded plan. See notes 21-24 supra and accompany-
ing text.
120. 477 F.2d at 863.
121. Id. at 863-64.
122. 501 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1974).
123. Id. at 1044. This type of SUB credit accrues when an employee is laid off by order
of seniority. Id. at n.4. It appears to represent compensation for temporary deprivation of
a right. The steel industry plan in Hoffman did not have this leveling week provision.
Otherwise the plans were substantially the same.
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whether an employee does or does not work."'124 Relying on Ac-
cardi and Hoffman, 125 the court determined that veterans should
be given credit units during the period of their military service.
Conversely, in a third pre-Alabama Power decision, Coffy v.
Republic Steel Corp.,126 a district court decided that a returned
veteran was not entitled to the SUB credits which the veteran
claimed had accrued during his period of military service. The
SUB plan 127 in Coffy provided that
[i]f an employee enters the armed services directly from the em-
ployment of the Company, he shall, while in service, be
deemed for the purposes of the Plan to be on leave of absence
and shall not be entitled to any Benefit. Only the credit units
credited to him at the time of his entry into such service shall be
credited to him upon his reinstatement as an employee of the
Company with unbroken continuous service, except as may
otherwise be required by law.128
This provision appeared to formalize an agreement between the
Union and the Company that the SUB plan was contingent on an
actual work requirement.
Judge Thomas stated that "[tlhe decision in this case, applying
the essence of Foster, [sic] turns on whether the Plan's SUB credit
units are 'designed to measure time on the payroll rather than
hours on the job,' ",129 that is, whether the apparent work require-
ment was bona fide. The court noted that under the Plan, a
worker received SUB benefits based upon his number of credit
units. More precisely, a worker earned one-half credit unit for
each week in which he had (1) hours worked for the company, (2)
hours not worked, but paid for, such as vacation, and (3) hours
not worked and not paid for, but lost due to union duties or disa-
bility. 1 30
The court looked closely at the actual work practices in the
steel industry to decide whether the above provisions of the Plan
met the work requirement test of Foster. One witness for the
union testified that since no minimum number of hours was speci-
fied in the plan, a worker could theoretically receive one-half
124. Id. at 1045.
125. See notes 62-67 supra and accompanying text.
126. 90 L.R.R.M. 2901 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
127. See Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan, for Employees of Republic Steel
Corp., Established Pursuant to Agreement with United Steelworkers of America (Effective
January 1, 1969), [hereinafter cited as Plan].
128. Id. at § 7.2.
129. 90 L.R.R.M. at 2905.
130. Plan, supra note 127, at § 2.0.
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credit unit for one hour of work in a week. This could be the type
of "bizarre result" prohibited by the Court in Accardi.'3'
Another witness for the company, who had drafted and en-
forced the SUB Plan at issue, testified, however, that a worker
could not qualify for one-half credit after working only one hour
in a week because of industry practice. He stated that it would be
very unusual for any employee to work less than thirty-two hours
per week both because steelmaking is a round-the-clock process,
and because the collective bargaining agreement would make it
financially impossible for the employer to employ workers for
only one or two days per week. 3 '
The court accordingly concluded that the work requirement in
this SUB agreement was genuine. "It constitutes a bona fide effort
to relate qualification for weekly benefits under the SUB Plan to
work actually performed, and is designed to measure 'hours on
the job,' rather than 'time on the payroll.' "'133
The court reasoned that SUB benefits are paid only under con-
ditions in which the steel companies would traditionally have
compensated an employee in the form of wages or wage substi-
tutes. 134 Compensation for hours worked for the company, for ex-
ample, are wages. Compensation for "[h]ours not worked but for
which he is paid, such as vacation hours or hours for which he
received jury allowance," and "[hiours not worked and not paid
for but which were lost because: (1) he was performing his duties
as a member of. . .the Union. . .or (2) he was absent because
of disability for which benefits are payable..." are, by common
industry practice, substitutes. 35
SUB benefits are awarded only when a valid work require-
ment is met-not when a worker is on a leave of absence unre-
lated to his work. 36 Because the minimum work week in the steel
industry was, in practice, thirty-two hours, the court found that
eligibility for SUB benefits did not depend merely upon the pass-
ing of time and was, therefore, not a perquisite of seniority. 137
131. 420 U.S. 92 (1975). See notes 73-79 supra and accompanying text.
132. 90 L.R.R.M. at 2903, 2906. Essentially, the union contract required the company
to pay for a guaranteed minimum of 32 hours in any week during which the employee
works at all. Id. at 2904 n.2.
133. Id. at 2906.
134. Id.
135. Plan, supra note 127, at § 2.0.
136. 90 L.R.R.M. at 2908.
137. Id.
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B. Post-Alabama Power Cases: Inconsistent Results as to the
'Real Nature" of SUB Benefits
In 1977, the court of appeals remanded Coffy v. Republic Steel
Corp. 138 for reconsideration in light of Alabama Power. The dis-
trict court in Coffy, however, was unconvinced by the veteran's
arguments. 39 Judge Thomas conceded that the first part of the
Alabama Power test was satisfied: the veteran would have ac-
crued the SUB benefits at issue with reasonable certainty had he
been working at Republic Steel rather than being in military serv-
ice.' 40 But, since the real nature of the SUB plan was short-term
compensation for services rendered and not simply for length of
service, 141 the second part of the Alabama Power test had not been
met.' 42 The decision hinged on the genuine nature of the plan's
work requirement, which measured "hours on the job" not "time
on the payroll."'' 43 When unemployed, the worker depleted his
SUB credits. When he resumed work, his weekly work hours re-
built his credit up to the maximum level of fifty-two units. The
court therefore concluded that SUB benefits are essentially earned
and re-earned, not unlike conventional wages.t44
The plan in Coffy also required that before a worker receives
SUB benefits he or she must be employed continuously for two
years. The court determined that this provision was an eligibility
138. 96 L.R.R.M. 2107 (6th Cir. 1977).
139. 461 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ohio 1978). It is interesting to note that this is the same
court which on remand of LaPinta v. Ohio Crankshaft treated the pension benefit differ-
ently in light of Alabama Power. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
140. 461 F. Supp. at 345.
141. Id. at 346.
142. The Supplemental Brief for the Defendant points out that
the steel industry itself recognized the difference between pension rights and SUB
payments. The Alabama Power case went to the Supreme Court because the pen-
sion plan at issue in that case provided that the employee did not receive service
credit for time spent in the military. . . . As the Court will note, the Republic
Steel pension plan specifically provides that service is not broken by military
leave of absence. ... Thus the defendant. . . recognized its obligation to credit
military service to the employee for purposes of making pension calculations,
long before the Alabama Power decision was rendered. It also recognized, how-
ever, that the nature of SUB payments was very different.
Supplemental Brief of Defendant at 3- 4.
143. 461 F. Supp. at 346.
144. Id. The opinion cited the decision in Aiello v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 570 F.2d
145 (6th Cir. 1978). In reviewing a suit to recover vacation pay based on the provisions of
the Veterans' Act, the court again used the tests of Alabama Power. The Aiello court con-
cluded that the returning veteran was not entitled to "benefits requir[ing] more than contin-
ued status; [these benefits] were conditioned upon a work requirement demanding actual
performance on the job." Id. at 148.
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requirement, not a test of longevity, 145 because the same minimum
period applied equally to all employees. 146 With no other connec-
tion to an employee's length of service, the real nature of the SUB
benefit plan was short term compensation.
A few months after Coffy 11, the Southern District Court of
Ohio, in Thornhill v. Ormet Corp., 14 rejected the Coffy decisions,
adopting the reasoning of Hoffman and Akers.'4 The SUB Plan
at issue was the same plan as in Hoffman and Coffy. The court
engaged in a detailed analysis of the character and function of
SUB plans in comparison to pension plans, observing that SUB
benefits, like other fringe benefits, had elements of both short term
compensation and rewards for longevity. 49 Ultimately, the court
decided that the resemblance to pensions and other seniority per-
quisites was too close to allow a supposed work requirement to
defeat the veteran's claims. 50
One significant departure from the Coffy opinion was the
treatment of the two year continuous service eligibility require-
ment. The Thornhill court characterized the two years as a vesting
period. Since vesting periods are designed to induce workers to
remain with the employer long enough to gain SUB eligibility,
SUB plans must be a reward for longevity. Later, the payment
itself is an inducement to sit out a layoff without seeking work
elsewhere.15 '
Continuing in this vein, the court noted that
the amount of the benefit is not strictly a function of the
number of hours the employee worked or his hourly wage rate
during the period he built up the SUB credits. The weekly ben-
efit is determined by the employee's hourly rate at the time of
layoff and the number of dependents he has for federal income
tax purposes, not on his gross wages for the credit period.'
5 2
The absence of a correlation between SUB payments and an em-
ployee's wage rate suggested that SUB plans resemble other sen-
iority fringe benefits. The opinion conceded, however, that the
benefits are linked to wages in the sense that if an employee does
not work during the week, the employee does not earn a SUB
145. Id. at 346.
146. 461 F. Supp. at 346.
147. 99 L.R.R.M. 2328 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
148. Id. at 2332.
149. Id. at 2331.
150. Id. at 2332.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2331 (emphasis in original).
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credit. 153
The court concluded that the SUB benefits did depend on a
meaningful work requirement. They were, at the same time, es-
sentially perquisites of seniority, since their purpose and effect was
the same as other seniority benefits. Thus the issue was whether
the work requirement necessarily removed the benefit from the
Veterans' Act's definition of seniority. This court concluded that
it did not: "[u]ltimately, the benefit is a function of the employee's
relative need and it operates as an inducement to continued em-
ployment. Were it otherwise, the benefit would be more closely
tied to the employee's total wages during the period he accumu-
lated the credits."1 54
Thus, the lines were drawn. The Supreme Court again had to
refine its test for what constitutes seniority. The district court
analysis in Coffy emphasized the genuineness of the work require-
ment in the particular circumstances of the steel industry. The
frequent accumulation, cancellation, and reaccumulation of cred-
its by workers suggested that these benefits are a form of short
term compensation, and thus not protected by the Veterans' Act.
Further, Cofly treated the two year continous service prerequisite
as an eligibility requirement, thus not comparable to the vesting
period required in pension plans and identified by Alabama
Power as a critical variable in its finding that pension plans were
perquisites of seniority. The Thornhill analysis emphasized simi-
larities in function between pension plans and SUB plans, espe-
cially the vesting period, and the lack of correlation between the
amount of SUB benefits and the number of hours worked.
No appeal was filed in Thornhill.'55 The Sixth Circuit affirmed
Coffy in a memorandum decision dated December 12, 1978.156
On October 29, 1979, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
case of Coffy v. Republic Steel Corp. in order to decide the SUB
issue. 157
C. The Supreme Court Decision in Coffy v.
Republic Steel Corp.
On June 10, 1980, the Supreme Court decided Coffy v. Republic
153. Id.
154. Id. at 2332.
155. Telephone call to the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, October 26, 1979.
156. 590 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1978).
157. 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
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Steel Corp. 158 and held that "SUB payments are perquisites of
seniority to which returning veterans are entitled under the
Act." '59 The Court began its analysis by reviewing its decisions in
Fishgold, 160 Accardi,161 Foster,162 and Alabama Power163 to enun-
ciate the principles under which the Veterans' Act is to be con-
strued. Justice Marshall proceeded then to evaluate Republic
Steel's SUB plan by applying the two part test set out in Alabama
Power. 16
4
The first prong of the test required "a reasonable certainty that
the benefit would have accrued if the employee had not gone into
the military service."' 65 The Court summarily held that Coffy
would have continuously accumulated credits if he had remained
continuously employed, and therefore that the first prong was
met.' 66 The second prong of the test was where the district courts
in Thornhill and Coffy had differed, and was also the focal point
of Justice Marshall's analysis.
The second prong of the Alabama Power test required that the
benefit be "a reward for length of service rather than a form of
short-term compensation for services rendered."' 167 Justice Mar-
shall first observed that SUB plans were developed in response to
labor's demand for a guaranteed annual wage. Therefore, he con-
cluded that from their inception
the purpose of SUB plans was to provide employment security
regardless of the hours worked rather than to afford additional
compensation for work actually performed. From the em-
ployer's standpoint SUBs, like pension benefits, help to assure a
stable work force through periods of short-term layoffs and,
like severance payments, may increase management flexibility
in implementing technological advances. 6
The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the district court
opinion which was based on the specific provisions of Republic
Steel's SUB plan and actual steel industry work practices. The
district court had held that the plan was genuine compensation for
158. 48 U.S.L.W. 4683 (1980).
159. Id. at 4687.
160. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 62-68 supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 74-80 supra and accompanying text.
163. See note 105-112 supra and accompanying text.
164. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4685.
165. Id. (citation omitted).
166. Id.
167. Id. (citation omitted).
168. Id. at 4686.
19801
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
work actually performed. This determination was based on the
finding that the steel industry had a defacto requirement of a 32-
hour minimum workweek. The Supreme Court, however, pointed
out that section 2.0 of the SUB plan allowed credits to be "earned
for weeks in which the employee is paid for any hours not worked
• . .or in which hours are lost because the employee is disabled or
performing certain union duties."'' 69
Furthermore, Justice Marshall commented that the "short
week benefit" 70 is the reason why a worker rarely works less than
32 hours in a week. He noted that "the union's success in effec-
tively achieving a guaranteed 32-hour week through the mecha-
nism of the short week benefit does not logically alter the nature
of the weekly benefit negotiated as part of the same plan."''
The most important factor in the Court's decision was its anal-
ysis of the true nature of SUB benefits.
Even if eligibility for SUB payments were closely related to
hours worked, that fact would not, by itself, render them com-
pensation rather than seniority rights. We emphasized in Ala-
bama Power that it is the nature of the benefit, not the formula
by which it is calculated, that is the crucial factor, for '[e]ven
the most traditional kinds of seniority privileges could be as
easily tied to a work requirement as to the more usual criterion
of time as an employee.' As we have explained, the specific
provisions of the steel industry plan support, rather than con-
tradict, our conclusion that SUB benefits are in the nature of a
reward for length of service. 172
The district court had concluded that SUB benefits were not
related to an employee's length of service because once a worker
has accumulated 52 credits he or she cannot accumulate addi-
tional credits, nor will the amount of the worker's credits increase
along with his or her length of service. The Supreme Court stated,
however, that if a benefit "perform[ed] a function akin to tradi-
tional forms of seniority" it was not necessary that the benefit be
"meticulously proportioned to longevity of service to constitute a
perquisite of seniority." '17  The Court also noted that the provi-
sions of the SUB plan on which the district court had relied in
concluding that the benefits were not perquisites of seniority also
169. Id.
170. The "short week benefit" in the SUB plan at issue provides SUB benefits for cer-
tain workers who work less than 32 hours in a week. The qualified workers who do not
work receive the weekly SUB benefit.
171. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4686.
172. Id. (citation omitted).
173. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4687.
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supported the opposite conclusion. For example, the two-year
threshold requirement before credits could be earned was similar
to the two-year thresholds of other seniority benefits included in
the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the amount of
the SUB payment to which an employee is entitled is not calcu-
lated on the basis of hours actually worked. 74
Thus, the Court concluded that the function of supplemental
unemployment benefits is to reward length of service rather than
to provide short-term compensation for services. Accordingly, the
court of appeals decision upholding the district court was re-
versed, and Coffy was remanded. 7 5
V. SUB BENEFITS: THEIR TRUE NATURE IN AN INDUSTRIAL
CONTEXT, OR ALABAMA POWER REVISITED
Alabama Power demands that courts decipher the "real na-
ture" of a benefit in deciding whether a returned veteran may ap-
ply his time in the military toward the benefit. The court in one of
the pension decisions'76 identified the problem of veterans' reem-
ployment rights succinctly:
The statute assumes that there exists a distinct line between re-
wards for status and compensation for work. In reality many
benefits combine the two: they recompense employees for both
status and work. These hybrids are out of place in a system
which recognizes only purebreds. Hence, we must "unmix" the
benefit in a way never foreseen by the contracting parties or the
Congress, to determine which characterisitcs trace their lineage
to seniority. 177
In evaluating the Supreme Court's opinion in Coffy, its reason-
ing must be compared with that of the district court.' The differ-
ences in their analyses illustrates the complexity of the decision
whether the true nature of the benefit was a perquisite of seniority
or short-term compensation for services rendered.
In order to "unmix" SUB plan benefits, and discover whether
they are a perquisite of seniority, the Supreme Court considered
what the parties intended to achieve by including SUB plans in
their collective bargaining agreements. SUB benefits were origi-
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Smith v. Industrial Employers & Distrib. Ass'n, 546 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1976).
177. Id. at 317.
178. See notes 138-46 supra and accompanying text.
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nally a substitute for the guaranteed annual wage 7 9 long sought
by unions. The plans serve as an income cushion for workers who
cease to work because of temporary business slumps. SUB pay-
ments have a function similar to vacation, holiday, or sick pay
benefits in the employment system. These fringe benefits relate to
temporary, usually short term, respites from the job. Credit to-
ward such benefits is accorded only to persons who have actually
worked for the employer. One commentator regards these pay-
ments, including SUB benefits, as a form of deferred compensa-
tion, bargained for by employees as part of a wage package. 80
The employee has in effect already earned the vacation or SUB
pay, but rather than receiving it all during actual work time, the
employee draws on it from a fund pool, when it is necessary to do
SO.
Unfortunately, these descriptions could just as easily apply to
pensions, eligibility for which the Supreme Court has determined
to be a seniority right. Functionally, a pension is the ultimate de-
ferred compensation. It is also an important bargained-for right.
As the Thornhill court acknowledged, "[a]ll benefits flowing to an
employee are compensation for services rendered."' 81 Thus, the
origin and function of SUB payments as a guaranteed wage sub-
stitute are not dispositive.
The true nature of SUB benefits, however, emerges more
clearly from an analysis of how they work in practice. To take
advantage of a SUB plan, an employee must meet certain com-
mon criteria. The worker must (1) be on layoff status, (2) receive a
state unemployment benefit, (3) be available to return to work,
and (4) work continuously for two years prior to the first applica-
tion for benefits.' 2 This last criterion could be considered simply
an eligibility requirement, as the district court in Coffy viewed
it,183 or as a vesting period characteristic of a seniority right, as the
Supreme Court concluded. 184
There are two problems with the Court's likening of this two
year period to the vesting period of a pension system. First, a one
or two year service requirement is common in union contracts
179. Note, Supplemental Unemployment Benefts and State Unemployment Compensa-
tion, 29 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 232 (1957).
180. Pierce, The New Look in Collective Bargaining Agreements. A Study of Supplemen-
tal Unemployment Benefit Plans, 3 HOWARD L.J. 42, 69 (1957).
181. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2330.
182. Plan, supra note 127, at § 3.0.
183. See notes 126-146 supra and accompanying text.
184. See note 174 supra and accompanying text.
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before a worker becomes entitled to earn or receive certain bene-
fits.' 85 Yet the vesting period in the pension plan at issue in Ala-
bama Power was twenty years of service, or fifteen years if the
worker was fifty or more years old.186 Further, the pension plan
in Alabama Power actually covered "all 'full-time regular em-
ployee[s]' who have completed one year of continuous service with
the company .. ". ,87 Thus, it may be argued that the two year
prerequisite under a SUB plan is designed as an entry provision.
If so, there is no connection between these two years of service
and the total benefits available during a layoff. Conversely, an
employee does receive credit for his twenty year vesting period
when his pension is later calculated.
The second problem with the Court's analysis is that pensions
function as a reward for length of service over an employee's en-
tire career. SUB benefits, on the other hand, function as emer-
gency compensation over a short period of time. Pensions
accumulate, while SUB benefits must be earned and reearned as
they are used. Thus, an employee who has worked for twenty
years obviously has seniority-in the traditional "length of serv-
ice" sense--over another who has put in three years. Their pen-
sion rights will differ accordingly. Yet, at any given moment,
these two individuals may each have the same number of credits
earned under the SUB plan. They may both hold fifty-two credits
(the maximum allowable under most SUB plans) until a layoff
occurs. Only then will "seniority" operate to determine which
employee must go home. Length of service-three years or
twenty-will not determine how much the worker receives in his
SUB check.
It appears in fact that there is an inverse relationship between
one's years of service and the likelihood one will benefit directly
from a SUB plan. When SUB plans were first included in collec-
tive bargaining agreements, employees and employers intended
that these benefits provide income security to laid off workers.
The employees who face layoff most frequently are low seniority
workers. High seniority workers have another mechanism to pro-
tect themselves: layoff order as determined by longevity of service
with the employer. 88 The longer an employee has worked for the
185. E. BEAL, E. WICKERSHAM & P. KIENAST, supra note 19, at 376-77; [1979] Basic
Patterns in Union Contracts 38-39 (BNA).
186. 431 U.S. at 590.
187. Id.
188. [19781 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 75:1.
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same employer, the higher in the layoff order he advances. Thus,
in practice, SUB benefits are inherently related to the lowest levels
of seniority, rather than to the passage of time.
The Supreme Court in Coffy refused to let the mechanics of
the plan's operation-such as the "short week benefit" and the
lack of proportional relationship between benefits and length of
service--deter it from focusing on what it considered the nature of
this benefit to be. Because SUB plans are a further protection
against layoff-after seniority order-the Court did not believe
the benefits could a term of compensation for work performed.'8 9
It should be noted, however, that there is not necessarily a log-
ically corresponding relationship between a benefit which pro-
vides immediate protection against layoffs and a seniority
perquisite designed to promote long-term stability in the job force.
Alabama Power set out a test which is based on whether the bene-
fit at issue is short-term compensation or a reward for length of
service. Vacations are a clear example of short-term compensa-
tion, and it is not difficult to understand the function of pensions
in the seniority system. SUB benefits pose an interesting issue
precisely because they combine both elements of the Alabama
Power test.
Perhaps the key to the "real nature" of SUB benefits lies in the
distinction between competitive status seniority and individual
benefit seniority. 19° Arguably, Congress intended only to protect
returning veterans from losing their competitive status vis-a-vis
nonveterans. SUB credits, like vacation time, are only measured
relative to an individual's own work record. When a veteran reen-
ters the work force he does so armed with a variety of short term
fringe benefits and income security provisions offered by his in-
terim military employer. SUB benefits appear to be just such
short term compensation. And, if the collective bargaining agree-
ment subjects SUB benefits to a meaningful work requirement,
the Veterans' Act should not protect such benefits. It is true, how-
ever, that the decision in Cofjy v. Republic Steel Corp. both liber-
ally construes the reemployment rights in favor of veterans, a
guideline established in Fishgold, and arguably satisfies the Ala-
bama Power test.
MARY WARREN REKATE
189. 48 U.S.L.W. at 4686.
190. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
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